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49 
“Maximalism with an Experimental Twist”: 
Insider Trading Law at the Supreme Court 
Zachary J. Gubler* 
Much has been written about the substance of the Supreme Court’s 
insider trading jurisprudence.  Commentators have argued that the scope 
of liability is too broad,1 not broad enough2 or maybe just right (although 
there don’t seem to be many Goldilocks in the bunch). Some, but not all, 
of these same commentators also try to explain how their preferred 
normative goals fit (or fail to fit) with the statutory and regulatory 
language.3  In this short essay, I wish to address a different question.  
Instead of asking about normative policy goals and questions of statutory 
and regulatory interpretation, I consider whether there is a particular shape 
the Court’s insider trading opinions should take.  In other words, is there 
anything we can say about the ideal breadth and depth of the Court’s 
insider trading opinions? 
I argue that the Court’s insider trading jurisprudence should be 
characterized by what I refer to as “maximalism with an experimental 
twist.”  By “maximalism,” I mean broad-based opinions that go beyond 
the facts of the particular case and that defer relatively little decision-
making power to lower courts.4  The “experimental twist” refers to a 
standards-based approach with respect to those aspects, and only those 
aspects, of the Court’s insider trading law that rely on policy 
assumptions—assumptions the Court should test by fostering varied 
 
*       Professor of Law, ASU Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law.  All errors are mine. 
1. See, e.g., HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 77-104 (1966). 
2. See, e.g., Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 
94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1373–74 (2009).  
3. See, e.g., id. (explaining how one could fit what is essentially an equal access approach to 
insider trading within the fraud-based structure of Section 10(b) through the concept of a general “duty 
to investors”).  These efforts to pay attention to the statutory requirements aren’t always undertaken.  
For example, it is not clear how the property-based view of insider trading—that insider trading is 
largely about creating and protecting property rights in information—is consistent with the statutory 
requirement of fraud.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties 
Into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1252–57 (1995) 
(commenting on the “emerging consensus” among academics that insider trading law is best defended 
as a means of protecting property rights in information without trying to reconcile that consensus 
theory with the text of the statute). 
4. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 3-4 (1999) (describing judicial minimalism as “the phenomenon of saying no more than 
necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided”).  
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approaches among the lower courts.  The experience with these varied 
approaches can then be transmitted to the Supreme Court at a later date 
through litigants and amici, thereby allowing the Court to refine those 
standards and make them more rule-like in light of that additional 
information.  
This maximalist approach (even with the experimental twist) is in 
conflict with both Chief Justice Roberts’s stated preference for narrow, 
fact-bound decisions,5 as well as the Roberts Court’s reputation for 
precisely that type of judicial minimalism.6  Considering the following that 
judicial minimalism has attracted among leading constitutional law 
scholars,7 the type of judicial maximalism described here is also decidedly 
out of step with current trends in the legal academy.  Nevertheless, the 
maximalist approach is the right one in the insider-trading context because 
of the nature and unique institutional realities of insider trading law, which 
are such that all lawmaking power has been effectively delegated to the 
Court.8 
This essay consists of two parts: First, I lay out the argument for a 
maximalist approach to the Court’s insider trading jurisprudence, but one 
with an experimental twist.  I then use this simple framework to evaluate 
the Court’s insider trading jurisprudence over the past nearly three 
decades.  I find that it’s a mixed bag, with the Court’s most recent effort in 
Salman v. United States9 being a particularly unfortunate case of a missed 
opportunity.  I conclude by suggesting where the Court might go from 
here.  
 
 
5. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) 
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to Be Chief Justice of the United States) (stating that as 
Chief Justice, he would “remember that [his] job [is] to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat”).  
6. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Court Under Roberts Is Most Constrained in Decades, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 1, 2010, 6:01 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/08/01/court-under-roberts-is-
most-restrained-indecades. 
7. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate But Equal?: The Supreme Court, the Lower Federal 
Courts, and the Nature of the “Judicial Power”, 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 1000 (2000); Christopher J. 
Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1458–59 (2000); Richard 
A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1998) (approving of judicial 
minimalism); SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 8–9. 
8. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.   
9. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/10
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I.  THE THEORY 
 
The principal argument in favor of judicial maximalism in the Supreme 
Court’s insider trading jurisprudence begins with the premise that insider-
trading law benefits from the type of lawmaking that we tend to associate 
with legislatures and agencies—broad, rule-bound, prospective-focused, 
expert-informed.  Yet, because of the institutional realities of insider 
trading law, the only body that appears willing or able to define 
substantive insider trading law is the Court.10  For this reason, the Court 
should incorporate these agency-like attributes into its insider trading 
jurisprudence.  In other words, the Court should adopt a judicial 
maximalist approach. Let me flesh out each of these claims in turn.  
 
A. Judicial Maximalism for the Court’s Insider Trading Jurisprudence . . . 
 
The difference between courts on the one hand and legislatures and 
agencies on the other is not that legislatures and agencies make the law 
while courts interpret it.  It should be fairly uncontroversial at this late date 
to observe that even those judges most committed to principles of judicial 
restraint sometimes end up making law.11 Rather, the difference between 
these various governmental decision-makers has to do with the types of 
laws they make and the comparative competencies that they bring to the 
task.   It is a familiar observation from the institutional design literature 
that agencies and legislatures tend to be better than courts when it comes 
to lawmaking that is broad, rule-bound, informed by experts and contains 
substantial prospective clarity.12  Courts, on the other hand, excel at 
incremental, ad hoc decision-making that is focused on the facts at hand.13   
From an institutional design perspective, it seems that insider trading 
 
10. See infra notes 17-39 and accompanying text.  
11. While this statement might be somewhat more contestable with respect to statutory and 
constitutional interpretation, it should be fairly obvious and non-controversial with respect to common 
law, of which federal insider trading law is one species.  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common 
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 21 (1985). 
12. See, e.g., Michael Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747 (2011) 
(comparing agencies and courts along these dimensions and arguing that patent law would be better 
served if promulgated by agencies); Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust 
Needs a New Deal, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1247 (2011) (the same but in the context of antitrust law). 
13. See Burstein, supra note 12; and see Haw, supra note 12.   
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law would benefit from the type of lawmaking that agencies and 
legislatures specialize in. Insider trading law has the potential to affect 
information sharing among some of the most important actors in our 
economy,14 which would seem to place a premium on the need for clear 
rules rather than muddy standards.  It’s a fairly technical field, requiring 
fine-grained policy analysis,15 and therefore would appear to require a fair 
amount of expertise.  It has to do with the commercial arena, where settled 
expectations are particularly valuable.16  And it is subject to the types of 
penalties—criminal and severe civil penalties17—that are thought to 
demand clarity for not just pragmatic but constitutional concerns as well.18  
 However, the insider trading context is unusual because of the 
historic reluctance on the part of both Congress and the SEC to establish 
the scope of insider trading liability.  Despite numerous calls for Congress 
to act over the years,19 and notwithstanding (at times) harsh criticism 
directed at the Court’s efforts,20 Congress has deferred completely to the 
 
14. The market cap of the 3,000 largest companies traded on U.S. markets exceeds $25 trillion. 
See U.S. Stock Market Tops $25 Trillion – Up 1.9 Trillion Since Election (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://seeking alpha.com/article/4040012-u-s-stock-market-tops-25-trillion-1_9-trillion-since-election.    
15. The problem is that insider trading has both benefits (including that it can promote market 
efficiency and serve as a means of incentive compensation) and costs (including that it can undermine 
market integrity and cause corporations to undertake costly precautionary measures to prevent it from 
happening).  See, e.g., Zachary J. Gubler, A Unified Theory of Insider Trading Law, 105 GEO. L.J. 
1225, 1265–66 nn.224–26 (2017). 
16. See, e.g., Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1041 (2007) (observing that “[s]cholars and courts long have noted the 
damage that shifts in regulatory policy may exact upon reliance interests.”). 
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (providing a civil penalty of treble damages for insider trading);  15 
U.S.C. §§ 77x, 78ff(a) (2012) (providing for a criminal sanction of up to twenty years' imprisonment 
plus substantial monetary fines of up to $5 million for an individual for the willful violation of any 
SEC rule or regulation, including Rule 10b-5). 
18. See Hervé Gouraige, Do Federal Courts Have Constitutional Authority to Adjudicate 
Criminal Insider-Trading Cases?, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 47, 119–25 (2016) (arguing that the 
vagueness of the Court’s insider trading law might raise constitutional issues in light of the available 
criminal sanctions). 
19. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, The Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987: 
A Legislative Initiative for a Sorely Needed Clarification of the Law Against Insider Trading, 39 ALA. 
L. REV. 415, 416 (1988). 
20. Richard M. Phillips & Larry R. Lavoie, The SEC's Proposed Insider Trading Legislation: 
Insider Trading Controls, Corporate Secrecy, and Full Disclosure, 39 ALA. L. REV. 439, 446–50 
(1988); Richard W. Painter et al., Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O'Hagan, 
84 VA. L. REV. 153, 227-28 (1998); Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of 
Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O'Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1304 n.373 (1998) 
(citing sources). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/10
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Court’s substantive approach to insider trading law.21  What few insider 
trading laws Congress has enacted do little more than nibble around the 
edges of legal categories created by the Court—for example, extending the 
Court-made liability rules to control persons and congresspersons and 
enhancing available remedies.22  
Of course, one might argue that this doesn’t reflect a lack of 
congressional will to act but rather a principal of comity or deference 
toward the Court, which after all was the first mover in this space when it 
decided Chiarella v. United States23 in 1980, thereby establishing insider 
trading liability under Rule 10b-5.  If the comity argument were true, then 
maybe one could argue that there is a constant threat of congressional 
intervention that affects the Court’s opinions, and therefore Congress does 
influence the content of insider trading law, albeit indirectly.24   
This argument of an indirect influence seems unlikely in light of how 
entrenched Congress’ inaction seems to be. The Court didn’t actually 
define insider trading liability until 1980, following at least nineteen years 
of debate and litigation over whether and how Rule 10b-5 could be used 
for insider trading purposes.25  In light of this fact, the Court’s first mover 
 
21. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Federal Securities Fraud Litigation as a Lawmaking Partnership, 93 
WASH. U. L. REV. 453, 469-70 (2015) (characterizing the development of the law of securities fraud 
more generally as consisting of the Court creating the substantive law and then Congress, and the 
Court, making incremental adjustments later on).    
22. Since 1980, Congress has enacted three significant insider trading-related laws: the Insider 
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (“ITSA”), Pub.L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984).; the Insider 
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (“ITSFEA”), Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 
4677 (1988); and the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (“STOCK Act”), Pub. L. 
No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012).  ITSA established the treble damages rule for civil suits involving 
insider trading.  ITSFEA extended the Court’s liability rule to control persons and increased criminal 
fines and maximum jail sentences for criminal convictions.  And the Stock Act extended the Court’s 
liability rule to congressmen and women. For a general overview of this history, see Fisch, supra note 
21, at 476-80.    
23. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
24. Cf. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (arguing that the 
threat of federal intervention in corporate lawmaking alters the substance of Delaware’s corporate 
law).  
25. The nineteen years reflects the period from 1961 until 1980.  Rule 10b-5 was adopted in 
1942.  See Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).  The SEC began considering in earnest 
the use of Rule 10b-5 to extend liability to insider trading over impersonal markets under the 
leadership of Commissioner William Cary, who took the helm in 1961.  See Donald C. Langevoort, 
Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Law, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1319 (1999).  That was the same year that the SEC issued its famous Cady, Roberts opinion, see In re 
Cady, Roberts & Co, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), which laid the groundwork for the Court’s adoption of the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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status looks less like it was the result of eagerness than of desperation in 
the face of congressional inaction.  And even after this first move, 
Congress had numerous opportunities to clarify the substantive law but 
demurred.26  In fact, in 1987, the SEC itself specifically asked Congress to 
codify the misappropriation theory,27 which had been percolating in the 
lower courts and causing enormous legal uncertainty.28  Yet, Congress 
once again refused to act, paving the way for the Court’s ultimate adoption 
of the theory in 1997. Importantly, the Court’s 1997 definition of insider 
trading liability carried some important differences from the SEC’s 
proposed definition.29 In other words, not only has Congress deferred to 
the Court, but this deference seems to reflect a sustained, consistent long-
term policy decision rather than an accident of history that could change at 
any moment.   
What might come as an even greater surprise, however, is that the SEC 
has taken a similarly deferential approach to the Court’s attempts to define 
insider trading law.  Unlike Congress, the SEC has played a hugely 
important role in the development of insider trading law.30  However, that 
role has been largely limited to litigation in the federal courts rather than 
agency rulemaking.31  As with Congress, this appears to be a conscious 
choice.  There is no reason why, any time prior to 1980, the SEC couldn’t 
have adopted an insider trading rule pursuant to Section 10(b).  Such a rule 
would have been entitled to significant deference from federal courts, 
consistent with prevailing administrative law principles.32  But instead, the 
 
classical theory of insider trading in Chiarella, which was decided in 1980.  See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 
222. 
26. Insider Trading Sanctions Act Of 1984: Hearing on H.R. Rep. 98-355 Before the H. Comm. 
on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 13 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2286; see 
also Painter, supra note 20, at 201–02. 
27. See Jonathan R. Macey, Cato Inst., Cato Inst. Policy Analysis No. 101: SEC's Insider 
Trading Proposal: Good Politics, Bad Policy (1988), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org 
/files/pubs/pdf/pa101.pdf; see also Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 40 (1987) 
(statement of David S. Ruder, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n). 
28. See, e.g., Carlos J. Cuevas, The Misappropriation Theory and Rule 10b-5: Deadlock in the 
Supreme Court, 13 J. CORP. L. 793, 819-20 (1988) (briefly recounting this history). 
29. Compare Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987, S. 1380, 100th Cong. (1987), with 
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).  
30. See Fisch, supra note 21, at 480-83 (describing the SEC’s role)  
31. Id. 
32. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/10
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SEC decided to take the more indirect litigation approach for shaping the 
law. 33  
It turns out that, in the case of the SEC, the Court’s first-mover status is 
much more consequential than in the case of Congress.  At any time, 
Congress could enact an insider trading law that replaces or substantially 
modifies the Court’s insider trading jurisprudence.  The fact that it hasn’t, 
despite many opportunities and even calls to do so,34 is evidence of its 
implicit delegation of lawmaking authority to the Court.  The SEC does 
not hold a similar power with respect to the Court.  Once the Court acted 
by interpreting the statute (10(b)) and the rule (10b-5) in Chiarella, the 
SEC found itself hemmed in by the Court’s interpretation.35  Thus, the 
SEC’s failure to adopt rules since 1980 that would define the substance of 
insider trading law can’t be seen as an attempt to let the Court dominate 
the space.  To be sure, the SEC has tried to clarify the Court’s 
jurisprudence at times, most notably with Rule 10b5-2.36  However, some 
lower courts have simply dismissed the plain meaning of that rule on the 
basis that it conflicts with the Court’s opinions, which simply underscores 
the SEC’s relatively weak position as an expositor of insider trading law.37 
 Thus, as a descriptive matter, Congress seems to have implicitly 
delegated lawmaking authority on insider trading law to the Court, and, 
even if it has the desire to play a bigger role, the SEC is left with no choice 
other than to take the Court’s lead.  In other words, if, as argued above,38 
insider trading law is to reflect the type of broad, rule-based, forward-
 
33. See Fisch, supra note 21, at 480-83. 
34. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.  
35. This conclusion follows from the Chevron doctrine, under which the court owes the agency 
no deference if the statute is unambiguous. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) 
(finding that greenhouse gases constitute an “air pollutant” under the Clean Air Act, in contrast with 
the EPA’s preferred interpretation of that language).   
36. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2017). 
37. See, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003) (opining that, contrary, to Rule 10b5-
2, a marriage relationship alone is not sufficient to give rise to insider trading liability under Rule 10b-
5); SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 717 (N.D. Tex. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 620 F.3d 
551 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that Rule 10b5-2 is invalid to the extent that it creates 10b-5 liability for 
the breach of a confidentiality agreement); United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1015 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002) (stating, in contrast to the language of Rule 10b5-2, that “an express agreement can provide 
the basis for misappropriation liability only if the express agreement sets forth a relationship with the 
hallmarks of a fiduciary relationship”). 
38. See supra notes 13–18 and accompanying text.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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looking, expert-informed lawmaking that we associate with legislatures 
and agencies, we can’t count on the SEC or Congress to do this. If anyone 
is going to fill this role, it needs to be the Court. In other words, the Court 
needs to act more like an agency with respect to its insider trading 
jurisprudence, taking a maximalist approach to this area of law.39    
While insider trading law presents an institutional context that is 
unusually suited for a maximalist approach to judging, it is still necessary 
to consider the arguments for judicial minimalism. There are primarily 
three of them, two of which simply lack force in this context.  The third 
presents a real issue but one that can be mitigated through the 
experimental twist discussed below.   
First, there is the argument that judicial minimalism fosters democratic 
debate.40  In light of Congress’s implicit delegation of lawmaking power to 
the Court, this argument doesn’t seem particularly forceful here.  The polis 
can debate all they want.  But the legislature doesn’t appear to want to get 
involved in insider trading law.41  And, the SEC has its hands tied.42  In 
that environment, the democratic debate justification for judicial 
minimalism simply doesn’t carry much weight. 
Second, there is the argument that judicial minimalism reduces decision 
costs,43 which might be of particular concern for a multimember body like 
the Supreme Court that needs a majority but has to deal with strongly 
opinionated members who exhibit varied judicial approaches and 
philosophies, even among those members who seem to share the same 
broad-based political inclinations.44  But, with respect to decision costs, it 
doesn’t seem that the Court has had a particularly difficult time gaining a 
majority, even in its most maximalist decisions like United States v. 
O’Hagan45 and Chiarella v. United States46 where one would expect these 
 
39. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 10–13 (characterizing “minimalist” opinions as “narrow,” in 
that they resolve only “the case at hand” and “shallow,” in that they do not provide a broad-based 
theory in support of the ruling). 
40. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1915 (2006). 
41. See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.  
42. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. 
43. That is to say, the costs, measured in time, energy and resources, of making and justifying a 
legal decision. 
44. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 47. 
45. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).  O’Hagan was a 6-3 opinion and would have been 7-2 
but for Justice Scalia’s dissent suggesting that although the majority’s approach makes sense 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol56/iss1/10
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simmering conflicts to manifest themselves.47 Insider trading law just 
doesn’t trigger the types of disagreement among members of the Court 
that we see in constitutional law.   
The third, and by far the strongest, argument in favor of judicial 
minimalism (and against judicial maximalism) in the insider trading law 
context has to do with the error costs48 of maximalist decisions.49  Insider 
trading law obviously raises many empirical questions that frankly would 
seem to strain the competency of the Court.  For example, how broadly 
should the scope of liability be drawn?  Should it be limited to insider 
trading by fiduciaries or should it extend to insider trading by non-
fiduciary contractual counterparties or perhaps even to those traders with 
no relationship to the traders or the source of the information?  What effect 
would broadening the scope of liability have on markets and economic 
actors?  What about tippee liability?  Should it be limited to particular 
types of tips or extend to any type and what effect would this have, for 
example, on the analyst industry?  These questions would be difficult even 
for an expert agency like the SEC to answer, let alone a generalist court, 
none of whose members have a background, let alone expertise, in 
securities regulation.  For that reason, these questions clearly pose a 
challenge to a maximalist approach to the Court’s insider trading 
jurisprudence.  However, this concern is substantially mitigated by what I 
refer to as the “experimental twist.” 
 
B. . . . But with an Experimental Twist 
 
To explain the experimental twist, it is useful to return to the claim that 
judicial maximalism requires the Court to act more like an agency.  Error 
costs are an issue at agencies as well as courts.  How do agencies manage 
 
generally, it probably is too broad with respect to criminal convictions like the one in O’Hagan.  See 
id. 
46. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).  Chiarella was an 8-1 opinion and the dissenter, Chief 
Justice Burger, was actually in favor of the more maximalist alternative of adopting the 
misappropriation theory despite the government’s failure to submit that theory to the jury.  See id.  
47. For a discussion of why these opinions can be considered maximalist, see infra notes 52-72 
and accompanying text.   
48. That is to say, the risk of getting a decision wrong and the magnitude of the effects of such 
an error. 
49. See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 49.   
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Gubler Article  3/26/18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 56:49 
 
 
them?  The answer is that they engage in some type of regulatory 
experimentation.50  They adopt temporary rules that generate data in the 
short-run that can then be brought to bear on a more permanent decision 
down the road.  Obviously, there are limits on the extent to which a court 
can engage in such experimentation.  But a court can reach similar ends 
through different means.  In particular, the Supreme Court could 
encourage the lower courts to take different approaches to contested policy 
questions by adopting standards instead of rules with respect to those 
contested questions and those alone.  After a period of time living with 
those varied approaches, the Court could then revisit the questions that 
were the subject of the “experiment.”  The lessons learned from the 
experiment would then be transmitted to the Court through the litigants in 
the case and amici, which would allow the Court to refine the law to make 
it gradually more rule-based and therefore more maximalist.51   
As discussed in greater detail below, the Court has essentially taken 
this experimental approach with respect to two highly contested policy 
questions—whether insider trading liability should extend beyond 
traditional fiduciaries and whether tipper liability should require some 
quid pro quo.52  In each of these instances, the Court adopted a standard 
rather than a rule, which has led to experimentation in different approaches 
among the lower courts.  The Court’s mistake in this area so far has been 
its failure to revisit those judicial experiments to draw from them the 
lessons needed to fine-tune the law accordingly.  
 
II.  THE COURT’S INSIDER TRADING JURISPRUDENCE  
IN LIGHT OF THIS FRAMEWORK 
 
How does the approach to judging set forth here—“judicial 
maximalism with an experimental twist”—apply to the Court’s insider 
 
50. See, e.g., Zachary J. Gubler, Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. REV. 129 (2014); Zachary J. 
Gubler, Making Experimental Rules Work, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 551 (2015).   
51. This assumes that the task of judging consists of trying to resolve a specific problem in light 
of the “best” reading of the law, consistent with the norms of the profession and that amicus briefs 
provide judges with information that they wouldn’t otherwise receive from litigants.  There is evidence 
that amicus briefs play precisely this role.  See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 749-50 (2000). 
52. See infra notes 53-61, 68-73 and accompanying text.   
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trading jurisprudence?  As a descriptive matter, this judicial philosophy 
doesn’t explain everything the Court has done.  But, it explains parts of 
what the Court has done, supplies criticisms for other parts, and points us 
in the right direction for the future.   
 
A. Chiarella v. United States 
 
The Court’s opinion in Chiarella v. United States53 is a pretty good 
example of the type of judicial maximalism I describe here.  The Court 
could have held that, whatever Rule 10b-5 means, it doesn’t extend to 
people like Vincent Chiarella, who, as an employee at a financial printer, 
has no relationship, let alone a fiduciary one, to the traders against whom 
he traded.54  Yet, the Court went further than that, choosing to identify the 
specific types of relationships that give rise to liability. 55  That is a 
relatively maximalist move. 
Additionally, the Chiarella Court exhibited the experimental twist.  In 
defining the relationships that give rise to liability, the Court adopted a 
muddy standard instead of a clear rule.  It held that liability arises from a 
fiduciary “or other similar relationship[] of trust and confidence.”56  That’s 
the experimental twist.  In defining the precise boundaries of liability, a 
highly assumption-laden exercise fraught with uncertainty, the Court 
adopted a muddy standard.  That standard could then theoretically give 
rise to different approaches in the lower courts and ultimately the 
opportunity for the Court to re-evaluate the precise contours of that 
boundary at a time when it could benefit from the information resulting 
from that experimentation.  And in fact, it has had precisely this effect.57 
 
53. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
54. See id. at 232-33. 
55. See id. at 230 (“[S]uch liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a 
relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction”).  Admittedly, this 
pronouncement didn’t require the Court to do much more than simply repeat the common law of fraud.  
Thus, while the opinion said more than was necessary to resolve the factual dispute in the case, its 
maximalism was limited and not particularly creative.   
56. See id. at 228. 
57. Compare, e.g., United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 
467 (1993) (finding that the standard requires nothing more than a duty of confidentiality), with United 
States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (stating, in contrast to the language of 
Rule 10b5-2, that “an express agreement can provide the basis for misappropriation liability only if the 
express agreement sets forth a relationship with the hallmarks of a fiduciary relationship”). 
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Thus, Chiarella is an example of the approach to insider trading 
jurisprudence that I am arguing for here.  To be sure, as I’ve argued 
elsewhere, the substance of the decision was misguided for a number of 
reasons.58  However, as far as the structure of the opinion, which is the 
concern of this essay, it was pretty good.  But only pretty good.  The 
biggest mistake that the Chiarella Court made was in its refusal to 
consider the misappropriation theory along with the classical theory.59  It 
was an argument the Government made to the Court, but the Court 
demurred in light of the fact that the theory hadn’t been presented to the 
jury, and courts are normally unable to affirm a criminal conviction on a 
theory not presented to the jury.60  That may be so, but there was nothing 
that prevented the Court from announcing how it would have ruled on 
such a theory had it been presented to the jury.  To be sure, such an 
approach would be highly unusual in the ordinary course of judicial 
minimalism.  But, in terms of judicial maximalism, it would presumably 
be justifiable and desirable.   The Court’s failure to take such a maximalist 
approach has resulted in uncertainty and unfairness that persists to this 
day.   
With a few caveats, Chiarella is a pretty good example of maximalism 
with an experimental twist. However, the whole idea of the experimental 
twist is that the muddy standards that underlie the experimental approach 
will be revisited and incrementally refined (and presumably converted into 
clear, maximalist rules) over time in light of the lessons learned from the 
lower courts’ varied experience, which gets transmitted to the Court 
through litigants and amici.  In other words, for the experimental twist to 
work, the Court needs to revisit its past experiments, learn from them and 
incorporate that learning into the law.  Yet, the Court really hasn’t done 
that with respect to the Chiarella experiment involving the scope of 
liability.  The Court has to this day never refined its “similar relationship 
of trust and confidence” standard.  
 
 
 
58. See Gubler, supra note 15, at 1240–52. 
59. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235–36. 
60. See id. 
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B. Dirks v. SEC 
 
A similar critique can be made of Dirks v. SEC,61 which, like Chiarella, 
seems, on its face at least, to be a pretty good example of the experimental 
approach to judicial maximalism.  There, the Court had to decide the 
contours of tipper-tippee liability in a case involving an analyst 
responsible for uncovering what was, at the time, the most significant case 
of securities fraud in U.S. history.62  It could easily have decided the case 
on minimalist grounds by simply saying that whatever the scope of tipper-
tippee liability might be, it doesn’t extend to whistleblowers.  However, 
the Dirks Court went further and established the metes and bounds of 
tipper-tippee liability.63  That is the maximalist part of the opinion.   
In establishing the metes and bounds of tipper-tippee liability, the Court 
was particularly concerned about the effect that an over-broad rule might 
have on socially beneficial information sharing and in particular the effect 
on investment analysts, who play an important role in fostering market 
efficiency.64  Consistent with our discussion above, this is precisely the 
type of question that lends itself well to the experimental twist, calling for 
a standard rather than a rule.  And that is precisely what the Dirks Court 
did: it held that liability turns on whether the tipper “receives a direct or 
indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a 
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.”65  This 
personal benefit standard allows the lower courts to experiment with 
different approaches, which could then inform future Supreme Court 
efforts to refine the test with a more maximalist rule.  And the standard has 
 
61. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
62. Note, Public Creditors of Financial Institutions: The Case for a Derivative Cause of Action, 
86 YALE L.J. 1422, 1424 n.8 (1977). 
63. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 ([“T]he initial inquiry is whether there has been a breach of duty by 
the insider. This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct 
or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that 
will translate into future earnings.”). 
64. See id. at 661–62 (“In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or 
abstain, it thus is necessary to determine whether the insider's “tip” constituted a breach of the insider's 
fiduciary duty. All disclosures of confidential corporate information are not inconsistent with the duty 
insiders owe to shareholders. In contrast to the extraordinary facts of this case, the more typical 
situation in which there will be a question whether disclosure violates the insider's Cady, Roberts duty 
is when insiders disclose information to analysts.”). 
65. Id. at 663. 
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indeed led to different approaches among the lower courts.66  However, the 
learning piece of the puzzle has not yet happened, despite opportunities 
like Salman v. United States.67  For that reason, Dirks, like Chiarella 
before it, seems to be a good example of the correct approach to the 
Court’s insider trading jurisprudence, but one that falters in the follow-up 
or lack thereof.      
 
C. United States v. O’Hagan 
 
The next lodestar in the Court’s insider trading jurisprudence, United 
States v. O’Hagan,68 is also a maximalist opinion.  The Court could have 
held that, at the very least, traditional fiduciaries, like the lawyer James 
O’Hagan, are liable when they trade on information obtained from their 
principals.  The Court went further, however, holding that liability arises 
from the breach of a duty arising from any fiduciary or other similar 
relationship of trust or confidence owed to the source of the information.69     
O’Hagan was insufficiently maximalist in that it failed to clarify the 
relationship between the misappropriation theory and the classical theory.  
The O’Hagan Court said that “the two theories are complementary, each 
addressing efforts to capitalize on nonpublic information through the 
purchase or sale of securities.”70   This was much too indefinite.  
Moreover, this indefiniteness can’t really be defended on experimental 
grounds.  The precise relationship between the two theories of primary 
liability doesn’t seem to be the type of question—like the effect broad 
tipper-tippee liability will have on the analyst industry—that could benefit 
from experimentation.  Indeed, it hasn’t resulted in much experimentation 
at all.  The lower courts have more or less reached a consensus that the 
classical and misappropriation theories are distinct and separate theories of 
liability, the former applying to cases involving classical insiders and the 
 
66. Compare, e.g., United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 454 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that a 
gift alone, even if to a family member or close friend, is insufficient to give rise to insider trading 
liability), with Salman v. United States, 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that a gift alone to a 
family member or close friend gives rise to insider trading liability). 
67. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
68. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
69. See id. at 652. 
70. See id. at 652. 
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latter applying to cases of outsider trading.71  As I’ve explained elsewhere, 
this result has led to absurd outcomes among the lower courts, including, 
for example, the decision that using material non-public information to 
trade in debt securities is legal for insiders, but not outsiders, to the issuers 
of that debt.72  Thus, while the O’Hagan opinion adopted a (weakly) 
maximalist approach, it’s refusal to go the distance effectively perpetuated 
the problem created by the Court’s failure in Chiarella to consider 
competing theories of liability and their relationship. 
 
D. Salman v. United States 
 
Finally, we come to Salman v. United States,73 the Court’s most recent 
foray into the substance of insider trading liability.  If Chiarella and 
O’Hagan are (albeit imperfect) examples of maximalism with an 
experimental twist, then Salman is the counter-example.  In fact, Salman is 
a much better example of judicial minimalism than Chiarella or O’Hagan 
is of judicial maximalism.  Indeed, in some ways, Salman is the platonic 
ideal of judicial minimalism.  The opinion basically does little more than 
decide the facts of the case before it—whether a gift of information 
between relatives satisfies the Dirks personal benefit test.74 The Salman 
Court said that it did, which wasn’t all that surprising considering that the 
Dirks Court effectively had said the same thing twenty-three years before, 
although in dicta.75   
Although characteristic of the judicial minimalism of the Roberts 
Court, in the insider trading context, Salman represents a real missed 
opportunity.  A more maximalist opinion would have clarified outstanding 
issues—like the relationships between the classical and misappropriation 
theories—and it would have revisited some of the experiments that the 
Court had set up in the past but has not yet considered the resulting lessons 
learned, for example, the experiment created in Dirks testing the correct 
contours of the personal benefit test.76 I see little reason, in the almost 
 
71. See Gubler, supra note 15, at 1230 n.22. 
72. See id. at 1230-31. 
73. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
74. See id. at 427-28. 
75. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).  
76. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
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quarter decade since Dirks, why the Court does not now have access to the 
relevant information for making the personal benefit test more rule-based.  
Similarly, it is well past time for the Court to clarify the meaning of a 
“similar relationship of trust or confidence,” especially in light of the fact 
that the SEC’s attempt to do so has been met with resistance among some 
of the lower courts.77  If the Court’s forbearance is due to latent concerns 
about its lack of expertise, it could simply rely on the SEC, effectively 
adopting Rule 10b5-2’s definition.  Its failure in Salman to do any of these 
things and instead hew to a minimalist approach was an unqualified 
mistake.  Hopefully another case will come along where it might engage in 
the judicial maximalism demanded by the institutional realities of U.S. 
insider trading law. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In concluding, I should say that judicial minimalism has much to 
recommend it.  But not in the insider trading context, where the only body 
that is willing and able to engage in lawmaking is the Supreme Court.  For 
that reason, the Court should adopt a maximalist approach to insider 
trading law, which favors broad-based rules and a willingness to look far 
beyond the facts of a given case.  While the error costs of such an 
approach are admittedly high, they can be mitigated through an 
experimental approach – that is to say, the use of standards for discrete, 
highly contested issues, where the standards are intended to be refined into 
rules in light of the lessons learned from the lower courts’ varied 
experience applying the standards.  Judicial maximalism with an 
experimental twist doesn’t do the best job explaining the Court’s insider 
trading jurisprudence, particularly its most recent efforts.  Rather, it 
reflects an aspiration. The sooner the Court recognizes and adopts that 
aspiration, the better.     
 
 
 
77. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.   
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